Is Frege's Venus Translated?
- A Peircean (Meta-) Translative Approach

Lim, Dhonghui[*]

I. Introduction

This research aims to discuss the nature of 'sign', 'sense', and 'referent' in Frege's two stars as Venus from a Peircean metasemiotic and metatranslative perspective. Frege's (1892) subclassification of meaning into a display-sensitive morphocentric[1] meaning (a.k.a. Sinn or sense) and a physically available referent (a.k.a. Bedeutung or reference) is widely discussed by a number of scholars in language sciences (cf. see Frege (1948)

* Pusan National University, Department of Language & Information, Lecturer & Ph.D. Candidate

1) In this research, the term 'morphocentric' means the form-oriented attitude used in research. This attitude implies Frege's (1892) antipsychologist inclination toward the objective abstract forms in the visual sign modality/ system (thus, not referring to the morphology-centered theoretical methodology in linguistics exclusively).

for the English version). This kind of metasemantic subclassification is said to be applicable not only to the singular-term-related semantic analysis but also to the truth-value-related logical explication (even though the theoretical validity is treated in diverse ways by different philosophers). Despite its sign-related significance, however, Frege's trichotomy (i.e., name vs. sense vs. referent) is often focused on the propositional identity (thus, the notion and function of 'sense' exclusively devised for that puzzle) in logic. When criticism is made against Frege's notions, alternative models are proposed with various paradigms on proper names or references in philosophy. On the other hand, in semantic theories, the term 'sense' (as in a 'word sense') is loosely applied to any signification for the property-related content of an expression (cf. intension; signified) as long as the expression contains any mode of presentation (Marti, 1998). Given the question on the validity and applicability of Frege's notions about proper names, this research proposes that it is worthwhile to go back to the basics and see if the sign process itself is a kind of translative operation (Peirce, 1931-1958) and, also, if Frege's Venus examples are translated (meta-) semiotically (particularly, by Frege himself).

By employing Peirce's unique paradigm of translation per se as a sign-internal meaning-making (thus, interpretive) process (a.k.a. semiosis) and considering the recent translation typology of the Peircean tradition (Jakobson, 1959; Petrilli, 2003; Lim, 2014; Quieroz & Aguiar, 2015), this research attempts to examine and describe the underlying (meta-) translative processes and/or patterns that Frege uses in his Venus-centered theorization. By means of a metasemiotic and metatranslative approach to Frege's Venus-related notions, it is expected to get a better understanding about the Fregean mechanism of the referent-specific sign process and the metalinguistic function of the Peircean translation theory.

II. Background & Questions Raised

When it comes to the sense-referent relationship[2] of the proper name[3], Frege proposes a clear dichotomy between the two notions. Explicitly expressed by a proper name, a sense[4] is "something that represents an aspect of an [individually definite] object" (McGinn, 2015, 15). As an objective "representational entity", it is available for the interpretation[5] (or 'illumination') of only one aspect of the referencing (McGinn, 2015, 13-15).

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2) The sense-referent relationship of the proposition toward the expressed thought and the truth-value is to be put aside in this research for the sake of theoretical efficacy.

3) According to Frege (1948, 210), "any designation" used to stand for a single "definite object" can be a proper name (cf. a 'sign' or 'name' used to refer to a proper name).

4) There are some key notions about the sense that Frege (1892) proposes: (1) the objective abstract entity with a name-related image form (≠ subjective memories of sense-based impressions and/or acts); (2) the common property (accessible and sharable across spatiotemporal barriers inside a linguistic community); (3) something reflecting an aspect of the object (when addressed as the referent) (McGinn, 2015, 14); (4) [something] abstract and objective that exists independently of human minds and/or experiences (ibid., 22); (5) the illuminator of an aspect (of the referent) (ibid., 15) (cf. caution: a mode of presentation as a part of the sense, not itself); (6) like the optical image of Venus, the referent, in the lens of a looking glass (thus, neither an individual person's visual experience or associated idea based on the image on his/ her retina nor an individual person's mental/ psychological mode unique to his/ her mind) (ibid., 20-21). When it comes to the main characteristics of the sense (S) in relation to the referent (R), Frege (1892) highlights the following premises: (1) S can determine R; (2) S can represent an aspect (or a property) of the object for/ as R; (3) S can contain or include a mode of presentation of/ for R; (4) S can be more ample or diverse than R; (5) S may be born out of a definite expression without R (in natural language) (McGinn, 2015, 17).

5) Even though the sense plays an important role in the interpretation of a proper name, it makes a partial contribution only. This, however, does not mean that language users can obtain only a partial understanding about the referencing of a proper name by means of the sense because, according to Frege, every language user, that is, those who are familiar with a certain particular language can successfully grasp the sense of a proper name in that language not as part of his/ her mental activity or conceptual knowledge but as the illuminator of an aspect of the reference or referencing related to the definite object/ referent (McGinn, 2015, 13-15; ibid., 20-23).

Namely, a sense is a logically abstracted form with a "mode of presentation" (Medina, 2005, 48) for the pinpointed entity. On the other hand, the referent[6] is the very entity that is being referred to (cf. reference, denotation) (Frege, 1892; Medina, 2005; Klement, n.d.).

When two linguistic signs for a single unique object/ entity are in the relation of identity, such a relation (Phosphorus = Hesperus) exists not between the object/ entity as the referent and itself (Venus = Venus) but between the proper names by having the two different names refer to and denote the unique object as the same referent according to Frege (McGinn, 2015, 3-7). This relation for names should apply only under the condition that it is mediated in such a way that the linguistic signs or names refer to some object or entity in common (McGinn, 2015, 8). Here, by virtue of the arbitrary mode of designation or referencing in a name as a designator (as a linguistic sign), the relation of identity can make sense. Only then, empirical a posteriori knowledge about that relation can be obtained. On the other hand, the relation of difference, too, can (and must) occur between two different names if and when "a difference is made in the mode of presentation" of the designated object/ referent (Frege, 1892; McGinn, 2015, 10). Only when a particularly different mode of presentation is given to a name (as a "sense" of that name), the linguistic meaning (or "the true definition" (McGinn, 2015, 12)) becomes explicit over and beyond the mere referent. And, then, the cognitive difference or different psychological/ perspectival notion (if there is any in names) can

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6) The so-called descriptivist versus causalist dispute and the mediated/ indirect versus direct reference dispute are of great significance in philosophy of language (McGinn, 2015). In this research, nevertheless, there is no intention or attempt to provide a new solution for such heated philosophical investigations, especially, in terms of the truth-value as a sentence's referent assessed in relation to the proposition-level identity or sense-level difference of another similar sentence.

be explained by this "sense" as it is the Fregean "sense" that can contain (rather than remain equal to) the mode of presentation (McGinn, 2015, 13).

Despite the semantic insight and philosophical contribution that Frege demonstrates in his theoretical argumentation on "a=a" vs. "a=b", there are some studies[7] that criticize Frege's theory of the name, sense, and referent. Given the theoretical information in the literature review[8], it is not hard to see that many of the previous studies on Frege's theory of proper names tend to focus on the theoretical validity, the logical applicability, the terminological (dis-) similarity, and the alternative options in philosophy (Sluga, 1993; Makin, 2000; Zalta, 2001; Chalmers, 2002; Anellis, 2012; McGinn, 2015; Klement, 2017; Perry, 2019). Yet, there are fewer metasemiotic studies on the process-sensitive and mechanism-specific working of the proper name as a unique kind of sign (Barker, 1985; Grodzinski, 1991; Ruthrof, 1997; Solomonick, 2014). Particularly, the attempts to approach Frege's

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7) Concerning the validity of the propositional examples, Wittgenstein refutes the theoretical adequacy of Frege's exemplification arguing that Frege's identity-related statements and propositions are too trivial and ill-formed to be considered for a philosophical investigation that requires substantial propositions and ideal languages (Wittgenstein & Russell, 1922). In terms of the logical consistency and applicability, on the other hand, the introduction or description (thus, the nature) of the sense itself is criticized due to its lack of logical systematicity. McGinn, for instance, points at the loose and messy applicability of the notion 'modes of presentation' (related to the Fregean sense) because, in the example of "a=b", there is no reason not to believe that each of the constituents 'a' and 'b' may be about the objects 'a' and 'b' (still, "a=b") instead of being connected to the senses "a" and "b" that contain a particular mode of presentation respectively (McGinn, 2015, 24). Elsewhere, the descriptivist attitude is criticized by the causalists ("Gottlob Frege", n.d.). Also, the mediated/ indirect reference theory is criticized by direct referentialists (or referential realism proponents) and, also, by use-centered theorists (cf. see Kripke's causal chain theory for the major criticism against the description theory (McGinn, 2015, 35-49); see Russell's referentialist theory for an account that distinguishes a definite description from a singular term (McGinn, 2015, 55-63)).

8) This does not attempt to encompass a whole range of research on Frege's philosophy because of the thematic irrelevance and disciplinary chasm.

Venus-centered examples metatranslatively are simply scarce.

At this point, it seems that a metasemiotic and metatranslative analysis of Frege's main examples can help shed light on the nature of Frege's sign model and its translative mechanisms in terms of the meaning-making dynamics of Venus-related names and terms. As there are not many Peircean[9] (meta-) translative approaches to the Fregean model, this new approach is expected to make a new contribution, especially, from a Peircean (or Petrillian) perspective on translation per se (Peirce, 1931-1958; Petrilli, 2003; Petrilli, 2015). It is a pilot research to test the Peircean perspective on translation per se with Frege's Venus, and its purposefully narrow scope will help examine the Venus-related examples in a concrete and systematic way, especially, in terms of the sign's essential components, types, and translation types.

III. The Sign and Its Translation

In order to better understand Frege's perspective[10] on the sign's meaning-making, it is useful to apply Peirce's metasemiotic and metatranslative model as it is theoretically systematic, flexible, and compatible in the sciences and humanities (Marais, 2019). The Peircean paradigm of the sign[11] embraces infinitely open-ended and interactively developmental

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9) Not all Peircean metasemiotic approaches are metatranslatively oriented. Hilpinen (1995) and Atkin (2008) compare Peirce and Frege in terms of the sign's components (cf. sign types, too, in the former) to examine the similarities and differences in their theories. Anellis (2012) makes a historiographical account for the same purpose.

10) Here, Frege's perspective on a proper name's sign process refers to Frege's viewpoint about the sense and the referent in relation to the Venus-related proper name. The analysis of his Venus-related viewpoint does not attempt to represent Frege's philosophical perspective and paradigm either as a whole or in depth.

dynamics among and across the three components (i.e., the sign form/ vehicle, the interpreted content/ effect, and the referent/ object[12]) available or conceivable in any sign system, modality, type, and sphere) (Peirce, 1931-1958). As the first step, the sign's three components need to be addressed: a representamen[13], an interpretant, and an object (ibid.). According to Peirce, the sign[14] is "anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way, as such conveyors of thought are familiarly known to us" [or to the users] (Peirce, 1903[15], quoted in Bergman & Paavola, n.d.). In a broad sense, it is "any medium for the communication or extension of a Form[16] (or feature)" (Peirce, 1906, quoted in Marty, n.d.). Simply put, when there is something (or anything, whether physical or not) that is standing for another thing in a certain respect or capacity to some (interpreting) agent, we can say that it is a sign[17] (Peirce 1897[18], quoted in Marty, n.d.). Inside a

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11) When it comes to the models of the sign, there are two major paradigms: (1) the dyadic model of the Saussurean paradigm and (2) the triadic model of the Peircean paradigm. The former focuses on the linguistic form-concept (a.k.a. signifier-signified) mechanism with no consideration of the referent at play (that is, either presuming the functional absence of an object in the interpreter's sign process or trivializing its role in the scientific inquiry) (de Saussure, 1916).

12) In Peircean semiotics, the term for what is referred to is 'object'. Fregean theorists often use 'reference' for such a term (to be distinguished from 'object' as a nonhuman or purpose-sensitive entity in the world). This research uses 'referent' as what is referred to, instead, for the sake of clarity. Peirce's term is to be used when it is relevant.

13) Due to the relatively greater salience and perceptibility, a representamen is often called a sign. This vague labeling causes confusion and misinterpretation. It, therefore, is not adopted in this research. A sign vehicle (or a sign form) is another term that can be used in an exchangeable manner.

14) Although 'sign' and 'representamen' may appear synonymous by being used almost interchangeably in many works, Peirce distinguishes the former from the latter by defining the latter as "whatever that [sign-related] analysis applies to" (ibid.).

15) (C.P. 1.540)

16) Here, the 'Form' means the (Peircean) 'Object' or referent (ibid.).

17) If motivated by (1) similarity/ resemblance, (2) causality/ contiguity, or (3) differentiality/

sign[19]), there are three components[20]). That which stands for[21]) another thing is called 'the representamen'. The thing that a representamen happens or seeks to stand for is called 'the object' (cf. the referent). Some corresponding or further developed thing that the sign user/ interpreter experiences is called 'the interpretant' (whether as a content or as an effect) (ibid.). It is the interpretant that many researchers pay attention to as the meaning and/or effect of a sign (form/ vehicle) can and should be viewed as the sign-internal translation (a.k.a. translation per se) into another system of some other signs (Peirce, 1931-1958; C.P. 4.127; Petrilli, 2015; Kourdis & Kukkonen, 2015, 9).

The main departing point for this new approach is the sign process itself. To be precise, it is the translative mechanism of the sign that this research proposes as a quintessential paradigm in making a metasemantic and metasemiotic approach to a word (or any sign form) and its meaning-making process(es). What exactly does this mean? Moreover, what is the fundamental relationship between the sign and translation per se? It is Charles S. Peirce who sheds new light on the nature and potential of translation in

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conventionality in the sign components' interaction and communication processes, the sign example can be realized as (1) an icon, (2) an index, or (3) a symbol in terms of the major sign types (Peirce, 1931-1958).

18) (C.P. 2.228)

19) In any sign (process), the triadic relation is at work. And, regardless of the nature of the specific sign system, modality, and/or sphere being involved in a given semiosis, the triadic dynamics is generally applicable: one takes up the role of the representamen; another functions as the object/ referent; the third shows up as the interpretant (ibid.).

20) According to Peirce (1931-1958), the object/ referent can determine the representamen as the former needs to be embodied in the latter. In turn, the representamen can determine the interpretant(s) in and upon the communication of the object (or its feature). The interpretant's functionality is, at least, twofold: (1) to represent the representamen and (2) to represent the object/ referent (ibid.).

21) When there is a certain aspect or idea of the object－instead of the object in all aspects－that a representamen stands for, it is called 'the ground' of the representamen (ibid.).

microscopically and macroscopically (thus, globally) insightful ways. His key perspective on translation per se can be summarized as follows: "Conception of a 'meaning', which is, in its primary acceptation, the translation of a sign into another system of signs" (Peirce, 1931-1958; C.P. 4.127, quoted in Marais, 2019, 85). According to Peirce, "[···] a sign is not a sign unless it translates itself into another sign in which it is more fully developed" (Hartshorne et al., 1931-1966, 594). Therefore, "[e]verything may be [···] translated by something: that is has something which is capable of such a determination as to stand for something through this thing [···] (e.g., the pollen-grain of a flower standing to the ovule). [Therefore,] everything is a medium between something and something" (Fisch et al., 1982, 333). In an open-ended interpretive network, "[the] interpretant [is] a translation into another language, [···] and its interpretant gets itself interpreted [···]" (Gorlée, 1994, 126).

Motivated by Charles S. Peirce's (1931-1958) triadic model of the sign that is based on the interpretive border-crossing (thus, translating) among and across the three components, Roman Jakobson and, later, Susan Petrilli provide further developed classification models of translation (Jakobson, 1959; Petrilli, 2003; Petrilli, 2012; Lim, 2014). In terms of the translation-centered mechanisms and typologies proposed by Roman Jakobson[22] and Susan Petrill i[23], it is possible to implement a metatranslative analysis of sign examples in a systematic and consistent way. Jakobson (1959) classifies translation into 3 main types: (1) intralingual translation from some signs into some other

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22) Please note that there are other proposals, which somehow show a relative degree of (dis-) similarity. For example, Silverstein's (2003) translation types roughly fall into the main types proposed by Jakobson.

23) For the theoretical summary and application in/ to Korean, see Lim (2015) and E. K. Lim (2013).

signs inside the same linguistic sign system; (2) interlingual translation from some signs in a language into some other signs in another language; (3) intersemiotic translation from some signs in a sign system into some other signs in another sign system (e.g., from verbal signs into nonverbal signs in the linguistic system, from nonverbal signs in the linguistic system into nonlinguistic signs in a nonlinguistic sign system, etc.).

In the major models of translation, there are five key points in common: (1) the infinitely open-ended mechanism and network inside a sign (process/ activity)[24] on a global scale; (2) the interpretive process made among the sign components as a translative process, that is, translation per se; (3) representability as translatability within and across various sign modalities/ systems/ types/ spheres/ worlds (Petrilli, 2003; Petrilli, 2012; Lim, 2014); (4) the important role of a translating/ interpreting agent; (5) the umwelt (that is, a sign-agent-specific semiosic environment) as a main factor (thus, effects as

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24) If a certain representamen example of some sign system ends up being interpreted/ translated for some content or effect of another sign system in relation to some referent, the sign process is a translative process (thus, translation per se) (Peirce, 1931-1958). In the process, if a representamen gets translated into some other representamen example that is part of some other sign system, intersemiotic translation can occur (Petrilli, 2003; Jakobson, 1959). If two different yet interrelated representamen examples get to implement a kind of intersemiotic translation within a big(ger) complex semiosis environment that is characterized by some unique set(s) of operational rules (i.e., a semiotics of its own), the intersemiotic translation example's sign process (as a meaning-making result or effect of some sort) gets involved in the larger sign system's intrasemiotic and endosemiosic translation processes (Petrilli, 2003, 17-37). Therefore, intrasemiotic translation and intersemiotic translation are not mutually exclusive in a semiosis. Generally, intrasemiotic translation is Peirce's (1931-1958) translation per se, which involves decoding as meaning-making as interpretation. Jakobson's (1959) tripartite typology proposes intralingual translation (as rewording), interlingual translation (a.k.a. translation proper), and intersemiotic translation (as transmutation). It involves the production of a new representamen of some identical or different sign system (thus, as encoding). This research employs translation from Peirce and, also, from Jakobson and Petrilli in focusing on the border-crossing dynamics across sign components and systems.

meanings may vary).

In order to prevent learners from developing a biased view toward glottocentrism, anthropocentrism[25], and/or passive receptive[26] interpretation, this research argues for a sign-centered (thus, sign-process-internal) paradigm of translation per se (see Lim (2014) for the in-detail account in Korean) (cf. Marais, 2019). This fundamentally Peircean paradigm of translation[27] per se proposes that, whether at the stage of sign interpretation or production and, also, whether by means of a human being's cognitive competence or some other (animate/ non-animate) agents' sign processing capacity, any and every sign process should and can implement some kind of translation (that is, naturally, conventionally, or artificially—in brief, purposefully—conducted connection or interaction among, at least, the three components[28] of the pertinent sign), so that a sign vehicle or form can come into being as a meaningful sign instance/ assembly/ network/ construct in an evolutionarily dynamic manner and direction (Petrilli, 2003; Petrilli, 2012).

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25) Although those insightful key points can be boiled down to the interpretation itself as a crucial engine (or function in a mathematical sense) in and for translation, it also entails a conceptually blurry risk or pitfall in that people may think of human interpreters as (the only) natural translators.

26) This view is derived from rationality-centered intellectualism that takes propositional knowledge to be the truth. Peircean thinkers criticize such views because the roles of the sign translator (as a bodily experiencer slash agent) and the context (as a factor) are largely underestimated (Legg & Reynolds, 2022).

27) It is crucial to approach and analyze this term from a Peircean metasemiotic perspective on the sign itself with no prior judgment or favoritism about the interlingual type. This differs from 'semiosic translation' of Torres-Martinez (2018) in spite of similarity.

28) As there can exist a wide variety of possibilities as to how and what to connect in a sign process, especially, depending on the nature of the participants and variables (e.g., translator, context, purpose, sign modality, sign system, resources for interpretation, etc.), the sign process as translation per se can give rise to and/or result in an (infinitely) open-ended evolution (a.k.a. development or expansion/ extension) instance in its meaning-making practice (ibid.).

IV. Frege's Examples from a Peircean Perspective

It is a well-known fact that Gottlob Frege made a contribution[29] for the development of a metasemantic theory. Using the example of Venus and its observer-sensitive appearances that people call 'the morning star' (a.k.a. 'Phosphorus' in Greek; 'Lucifer' in Latin; '샛별' saetbyeol in Korean) and 'the evening star' (a.k.a. 'Hesperus' in Greek; 'Vesper' in Latin; '개밥바라기' gaebapbaragi in Korean), Frege (1892) proposes the two different kinds of meaning: (1) Sinn and (2) Bedeutung, which are translated to (1) Sense and (2) Referent/ Reference (roughly meaning "the common property slash objective image with a distinct display mode" and "the object/ entity as the thing that is referred to by the name") in English (Frege, 1948, 212-213).

In Frege's exemplification made to support his proposal about the subclassification of meaning into the morphocentric meaning and the encyclopedic referent-centered meaning, there seem to exist some relational problems/ questions that should be addressed and discussed in terms of the sign-process-internal components, modalities, and mechanisms used for Frege's terminology as well as in the respect of the sign systems involved in the meaning-making practices about Venus. For example, is his sign composed of the single signifier (e.g., 'the morning star') and the 2 signifieds (e.g., "the star-like object in the morning sky" and "Venus the planet") in each reading

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29) Frege's metasemantic and metasemiotic classification is widely recognized as an insightful paradigm (or, at least, an important step) for a logical investigation in philosophy of language. It is mainly because, in an analysis of a (lexical or sentential/ propositional) meaning made in relation to a proper name, the first-stage distinction between the name's form-centered meaning (a.k.a. sense) and the name's referent (a.k.a. reference) is found to be essential and useful in dealing with the question/ problem of (non-) identity for a set of name examples like the morning star (or Phosphorus) and the evening star (or Hesperus) (e.g., (1) the morning star = the morning star; (2) the morning star = the evening star).

based on the Saussurean model of the sign? Does the communally shared meaning of 'the morning star' exist as a single objective entity or as a collective mental effect of individual interpretations? Is Frege's sense a kind of translation made by Frege, some collectively observable/ inferable quality, or the visual entity in the physical world? Is the Venus-based display mode applicable to all proper names as a main criterion? Is the Fregean sense similar to the Peircean interpretant (or the immediate object)?

As it is useful to examine the sign-process-internal relationship among and across what is verbally expressed, what is visually made explicit or available, what is semantically interpreted, what is semiotically interpretable or inferable, and what is immediately referred to (or ultimately referable), the Peircean metasemiotic and metatranslative approach to Frege's Venus-related examples is going to help obtain some central clues in terms of sign modalities, sign systems, and translation types. At the same time, based on Frege's logically specified examples, the applicability of the Peircean paradigm of translation will be taken into consideration in order to put it on the agenda.

4.1. In Terms of Sign Modalities

In terms of sign modalities[30], it is obvious that Frege (1892) relies on the

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30) From a Peircean metatranslative perspective, there are many different modalities (e.g., visual, oral, auditory/ acoustic, kinesthetic, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, etc.). When a sign component in some sign modality interacts with another sign component in some other sign modality in order to undertake a sign process, a quintessentially metasemiotic translation type called 'intersemiotic translation' can take place thanks to the meaning-making process as 'translation' per se (Peirce, 1955; Petrilli, 2003; Lim, 2014). With this microscopic slash macroscopic view, it is possible to understand that 'intersemiotic translation' as 'translation per se' as 'a semiosis' can occur in both directions: (1) from a sign form into the interpreted contents or effects (i.e., in an interpretive process) and (2) from a certain referent/ object into

visual modality with a minimum amount of consideration of the oral modality. He makes a strict delimitation for linguistic signs by placing the names within the oral modality and labeling proper names as the signs. His 'sign' in a word is a phonological sign form that is empty in its content. From a Peircean perspective, Frege's verbal sign needs to be viewed as the sign vehicle or representamen in the linguistic sign system. Not only 'the morning star' and 'the evening star'[31] but also 'Venus'[32] should be considered as the verbal representamen examples. As representamens in different modalities live on the users' experiences and habits of the pertinent semiosis realization through translations, the verbal representamen examples as arbitrary sound symbols need to be connected with some other visual representamen examples in the visual modality or with their mentally translated forms[33] in the minds among

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a distinct sign form (i.e., in a productive process). Still, both transactions engage in a sign process respectively (thus, sign-internally implemented) (Queiroz & Aguiar, 2015). Only from the Peircean perspective on the sign and, also, only on the basis of the ontologically translative paradigm of the sign process itself, it is possible to explain how 'intrasemiotic translation' and 'intersemiotic translation' can be implemented and observed within a single sign example at the same time. In Jakobson's translation typology, 'intersemiotic translation' is classified independently of 'intralingual translation' and 'interlingual translation' because Jakobson pays attention to the mainstream conception of the verbal language and the increasing demand of audiovisual translation or transmedial transmutation at the same time in his article (Jakobson, 1959). In this research, 'intersemiotic translation' does refer to the Peircean paradigm of translation per se as is clearly explained and highlighted in more recent works like Lim (2014) and Queiroz & Aguiar (2015).

31) In English and German, there are surnames 'Morningstar' and 'Morgenstern'. Frege does not have any theoretical notion or method that can sort out and filter out the surname-related senses and their referents (if the verbal signs are nothing but the superficial shells or facades which need to be filled in).

32) If the proper names for Venus the planet are taken as the departing point in Frege's theory, all the pertinent names should be analyzed for the scientific research. However, Frege ignores 'Venus' as an important verbal representamen example.

33) e.g., iconicity-based diagramatic or schematic image forms made via generalized abstraction of observed forms; indexicality-based spatiotemporality-sensitive forms developed from the

many possible candidates for the interpretants and/or objects. So far, Frege's sign (form), Saussure's arbitrary verbal signifier, and Peirce's representamen in the oral modality within the spoken language system do seem to have a lot in common. If Frege's model of the sign is similar to Saussure's dyadic model, the verbal sign form 'the morning star' is destined to be connected with some collectively shared meaning/ concept/ signified available in the minds of the community members with no referent/ object to be considered. However, Frege assumes that there must exist the actual referent slash ultimate object in the physical world/ dimension. As Frege labels the concrete word form as a symbolic sign, it is clear that he acknowledges the existence of (1) various sign systems and modalities at work and (2) some transmedial interaction slash intersemiotic translation processes for the ontology of a (meaningful/ effective) sign itself. Although Ruthrof (1997) classifies both of the form-centered meaning and the referent-oriented meaning as the signifieds, Frege highlights the interaction slash connection between and across the verbal sign (form), the distinct and ultimate referent, and some form-centered meaning (as an objective entity). From such information, it is possible to infer that Frege's sign model entails the irreducibly triadic relationship or function among and across the verbal representamen, the ultimate referent/ object, and some form-centered meaning potential or meaningful effect (which suggests the Fregean sign model's similarity when compared with the Peircean model) and, also, that Frege's sign components do require and implement some kind of (intrasemiotic/ intersemiotic/ endosemiosic) translation processes. Then, in his scenario of a semiosis, what exactly is the form-centered meaning of the verbal sign (form) 'the morning star' (or 'the evening star')? Frege's choice for

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immediate experiences of some abstract grounds; symbolicity-based—abstract or concrete— examples via abstraction or imagination.

logical metatranslative justification is the invention of the notion of a 'sense', an objective and abstract visual image that gives off a unique display mode and allows for a collectively common interpretation. To obtain or give any meaning, Frege argues that the (linguistic/ verbal) sign[34] form should be connected with the pertinent image form (i.e., sense) via some thought-mediated access route and, subsequently, with the actual object (that is, the ultimate referent) in the external reality.

Then, what exactly is the metasemiotic nature of the sense in Frege's terminology? Is the general everyday usage of 'the sense' in semantics the same as Frege's original criteria for the sense in his Venus-based metalanguage? According to Frege's proposals (see the definitions (1), (4), and (6) in footnote number 4), a distinct sense can be interpreted as an "objectively abstract image" as human thoughts can access it in spite of the fact that it differs "from the memories of some sense impressions [⋯] and acts" (Frege, 1948, 212). It, however, is not part of the human minds/ experiences and/or the individual ideas/ perceptions/ feelings because a distinct sense can only exist as an abstract and objective entity independently of any human intervention or association (ibid., 214). Therefore, it must be something like a telescope-aided optical image (prior to the individual visual perception and conceptual interpretation of such an image) (ibid., 213). Due to such characteristics, one can often see the claim that the sense should be viewed as the Fregean version of Peirce's 'immediate object' (Eco, 1976, 1462), especially, due to a context-sensitive representative character. Some may even argue that, in Frege's example of 'the morning star', the sense should be the

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34) Ruthrof (1997) analyzes Frege's 'sign' as a signifier. He concludes that Frege's 'sense' and 'referent' are the signifieds (e.g., the signified 1, the signified 2). This formula is largely similar to de Saussure's (1916) dyadic model.

immediate object slash immediate interpretant because, inside a sign formula, the representamen and the ultimate referent are already assigned with ease. Then, is it possible to conclude that the sense is akin to Peirce's (immediate) object or interpretant? To answer the question, it is necessary to consider the Peircean notion of 'ground', 'immediate object', and 'interpretant'. In the Peircean terminology, the object can be divided into (1) the immediate object (i.e., "the object as the sign itself represents it" and, thus, "the object as cognized in the sign [as an idea]" (C.P. 4.536)) and (2) the dynamical object (i.e., "the reality which by some means contrives to determine the sign to its representation" and, thus, "the object as it is regardless of any particular aspect of it" (ibid.)). On the other hand, the ground is "a single quality" and "the pure abstraction of a (general) attribute" (W I, 334; W II, 59; quoted in Chumbley, 2000, 415). As the (immediate) interpretant is "a personally realized product" (Chumbley, 2000, 407), it cannot be treated as being identical to the (immediate) object/ referent (thus, Eco's claim to treat ground, interpretant, meaning, and immediate object equally may receive criticism) (Chumbley, 2000, 412) (cf. a common ground of a community ≒ the immediate object-ground) (ibid., 416).

　　Upon a metatranslative analysis, it seems adequate to argue that the sense (for the verbal form like 'the morning star') is akin to (and more pertinent to) Peirce's 'ground[35]' (cf. 기반 giban "basis" in Korean) in that a certain

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35) A 'ground' is "the pure abstraction of a quality" (Peirce, 1931-1958, quoted in Deely, 1982, 61). In the respect of a quality, a representamen can refer to the pertinent object either iconically or symbolically. Peircean proponents treat the ground (as some preconceptual quality, which can function as a basis for an icon) only in terms of the representamen and/or the interpretant rather than for the referent (Bennett, 2016). Some compare this to the significatum, "the conditions for something to be a denotatum [that is, a referent] of the sign" (Morris, 1938, quoted in Cobley & Jansz, 2012, 111).

quality or property can be rendered into the purely abstract form or state (e.g., the pure whiteness of the dot in the eastern sky for 'the morning star') that helps the representamen get connected with the pertinent object as the referent, especially, via some translative/ interpretive process often motivated by iconicity or indexicality "in some respect"[36] (Peirce, 1931-1958, quoted in Sonesson, 2019). According to this analysis, Frege's three-part connection (i.e., name vs. sense vs. referent) is partially similar to Peirce's triadic formula (i.e., representamen vs. interpretant vs. object) (cf. ground) in spite of some in-detail differences[37] (that is, representamen vs. ground as immediate referent vs. ultimate referent).

In terms of the visual modality, Frege discusses two major means of observation for his selection of Venus[38] as the major example: human vision and telescope-aided optical vision. As a proponent of antipsychologism who disagrees to see a logical entity as part of psychological concepts and proposes to view it as an objective object (Kusch, n.d.) that exists independently of human perception/ conception (Kang, 2022), Frege attempts to resolve the

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36) (CP 1.551)

37) Taking the direction of the determining force for instance, Frege claims that each distinct sense can help determine the referent in the sign's meaning-making process (e.g., a certain display-mode-specific image form "a" or "b" → Venus, the referent) (McGinn, 2015, 17). However, in contrast to Frege's claim, the two abstract visual images (called 'senses') within two different time frames cannot determine the single referent (e.g., Venus in his account). It is because, firstly, the visual appearances of the bright star(s) in the morning and evening skies are either too similar (to the bare eyes) or too diverse (at the moments and positions of observation depending on the nature of the measuring tools and agents) and, secondly, it is the metascientific or metasemiotic concepts, not two image forms, that can help determine (the relative position and quality of) the (immediate/ ultimate) referent. Besides, the linguistic representamens like 'the morning star' and 'the evening star' contain the semantic clues (rather than the scientifically objective visual clues) about the distinct grounds.

38) Surprisingly, Frege never presents the reasons or criteria for his choice of Venus in the proper-name-centered investigation.

multiple-name-induced relational disputes on a unique referent by claiming that there exist different abstract image forms in the visual modality. Based on the optical images of Venus[39]), two abstract and objective image forms are proposed as the distinct 'sense' examples of 'the morning star' (Phosphorus) and 'the evening star' (Hesperus) (allegedly, shared by all the community members) while individual retinal-vision-based observations are ruled out as subjectively differentiated interpretations (cf. Kang, 2023).

Frege's claim presupposes the presence of the visual semiotic dimension independently of verbal language and human experiences. This suggests that the Fregean sense differs from the signified that de Saussure (1916) defines as the mental concept and, also, from the immediate object as the "object as it is represented" [situationally in a context] (Peirce, 1904, 32; C.P. 8.333; Ransdell, n.d.) (cf. Frege's sense as the 'immediate object' in Eco (1976) and Atkin (2008) criticized by Bellucci (2015)). Despite the metasemiotic literacy, there seem to be problems with this telescope-based claim: (1) Not everyone can access the same pair of optical-image-like[40]) visual forms about Venus (in his/ her mind and/or experience) every morning or evening, particularly, unless Frege meant "the human capacity for generating abstraction-based grounds" by 'the availability of the objective abstract images' (cf. image schemas (Johnson,

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39) As a matter of fact, 'Venus' receives Frege's exclusive treatment as the single and ultimate referent. However, if Frege's logic should apply thoroughly, (the sense of) 'Venus', too, must be based on and specified by the visual-appearance-related experiences. Then, the sense of 'Venus' (which is also sensitive to the mode of presentation) must consist of that of Phosphorus and that of Hesperus (cf. that of each mythological figure needs further discussion due to homonymy), which may not be the case for those who are exposed to modern science discourses (which continue to be updated).

40) In the Aztec culture, Quetzalcoatl is believed to refer to Venus. Although its visual shape and semantic meaning correspond to the "feathered serpent", there is no evidence that the optical image of an objective snake exists. However, some Aztec people may say that the "feathered serpent" can be analyzed as the sense of 'Quetzalcoatl' ("Quetzalcoatl", n.d.).

1987), core object recognition (DiCarlo et al., 2012)); (2) Like the moon, Venus is known to have various phases, not the single morning-sensitive shape and the single evening-sensitive shape; (3) The quality of telescopes (or even the availability thereof) cannot be equally guaranteed and must be changed greatly from person/ culture/ era to person/ culture/ era; (4) The Eurocentric rationalist root (Sluga, 1980) in the sense cannot explain subjective-ideation-based image forms (e.g., the feathered serpent in the Aztec culture) (cf. the question on metaphor); (5) Not all unique referents have a set of translation-induced names and a set of mutually disconnected visual appearances like Venus; (6) Since the planet[41] never presents itself to human beings in direct ways, (meta-/ inter-) semiotic translations for the (immediate/ ultimate) referent continue to evolve in extralinguistic contexts.

Regarding Frege's claim about the referent's lack of determining force toward the senses (McGinn, 2015, 17), a Peircean approach to it reveals that (1) Frege makes no clear distinction between the (immediate) object and the (immediate) interpretant while distinguishing the visual representamen as the situational instance from the immediate interpretant (i.e., the right abstract meaning), the dynamic interpretant (i.e., the actual effect produced by the mind) (Peirce, 1908; C.P. 8.343; quoted in Bergman & Paavola, n.d.), and the immediate referent respectively; (2) Frege makes no distinction between the verbal-form-based literal meaning and the (psychologically/ objectively) abstracted visual form (and, also, between the visual representamens' immediate referents and the visual-quality-centered pure abstraction called the ground); (3) Nonetheless, Frege proposes an irreducibly triadic mechanism of

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41) Knowing that there are still a lot of unknown things about Venus as a referent, it is even doubtful if Frege's strict orality-versus-visuality separation can describe and explain proper names' sign phenomena and the underlying meaning-making mechanisms.

a semiosis, which is similar to Peirce's triadic model (in spite of the internal rigidity); (4) In considering the symbolicity-based nature of the name, the iconicity-centered nature of the sense as the abstraction of a visual quality/ aspect, and the indexicality-related nature of the (immediate/ ultimate) referent (to be precise, that of the triadic semiosis), Frege's model implies that proper-name-specific sign types and systems do require intrasemiotic and intersemiotic translations for the production/ interpretation of an example; (5) Strictly speaking, the specific verbal-versus-visual exemplification made by Frege's metalanguage can help determine neither the abstract visual form as such (a.k.a. sense) nor the ultimate referent[42] itself, especially, unless the full consideration of the then metasemiotic and metasemantic knowledge (as networks of meta-level translations) can be made within the particular scientific (or sociocultural) context that was available to Frege and other educated people. Yet, the presupposition of the ground—instead of the immediate object—may help sustain and support the Fregean triadic model of the sign as the need to look for and look into the immediate referent/ interpretant comes to disappear tentatively in a discussion on the visual quality.

In brief, it is not only possible but also useful to make a metasemiotic approach to Frege's key notions in terms of the main sign modalities. In addition, it becomes clear that taking familiar things for granted (e.g., phonological sign forms in phonocentric languages like German and English, the visible appearance of a celestial object as a tiny white dot in the dawn/ dusk, metonymy's help in the verbal and visual translation processes, etc.) is

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42) Frege's choice of Venus seems to be an intentional or purposeful act because it can help evade many complex problems and complicated issues related to the semantics and pragmatics (as part of linguistic semiotics) of proper names in the world's (verbal/ nonverbal) languages (even though it is part of the visually peculiar phenomena that do NOT fully represent the nature of proper names or that of unique entities in the world).

likely to result in a reductivist proposal or biased claim (cf. proper names in Chinese letters with high iconicity, subjective ideas about the planets in metaphorically rich cultures with animistic or polytheistic beliefs, the discovery about the moon-like phases of Venus, etc. as some counterexamples to Frege's notion of the sense). Taking a step further, this research is going to consider the sign systems as another parameter in the next section.

4.2. In Terms of Sign Systems

Among various examples of sign systems in nature and culture, Frege takes four sign system examples to explain the names of a single unique referent: (1) the phonomorphemic[43] system of a particular European language (rather than the language system as a whole), (2) the visual system, (3) the logic[44] system, and (4) the mathematical system. Among the four major sign systems[45], Frege considers the phonomorphemic system in the orality-based language examples and the visual sign system in the human-species-mediated (thus, anthropocentrically translated) natural world to play a key role in a proper name's meaning-making process, at least, on the surface.

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43) In Frege's account, the name-related sign system in focus is not the (human) language system as a whole. Even in German or English, he offers no in-depth research on the metalinguistic principles and metasemiotic/ metasemantic taxonomies for proper names.

44) The relationship between logic and mathematics is not to be discussed in detail in this research as Frege's own opinion and attitude toward logicism will not interfere or intervene directly or significantly here.

45) However, it is the quintessentially functional system of logic (for the referent) and that of mathematics (for the equations involving the movements of the two stars, the morning star and the evening star) that need to be acknowledged in Frege's exemplification because it is impossible to infer the existence of the single identical referent in the outer space without the prior help of logic and mathematics that can figure out the underlying physical principles about the constantly changing morning star and evening star.

He argues that the spoken language system's meaning-making for a proper name cannot be completed without the help of (1) some collectively shared image form(s)[46] that can represent some (visual) aspect(s) or mode(s) and (2) the ultimately fixed referent available in reality. If it is the case, a particular language, especially, the sound output thereof, is nothing but a set of phonomorphemic forms in terms of a proper name's semiosis. In the language system, however, proper names are characterized by many diverse morphosyntactic forms, grammatical classes, semantic types, and paradigmatic/ syntagmatic constraints across particular languages (Schlücker & Ackermann, 2017). Reducing such complexity and uniqueness to a mere name tag, Frege tries to justify his logicism and blames natural language for complicated phenomena. As for him, it is logic or mathematics that should take up a key role as the code manual for names thanks to its capacity for computational operations (e.g., 2 forms = 2 names = 2 values = 1 object/ referent). The question is whether it is really the case in reality. As is mentioned in the previous section, Frege's minimized account on the language system leaves his theory on proper names susceptible to criticism. Since to do research in logic or philosophy does not have to mean to minimize or misrepresent the semiotics of the language system(s), his account seems to be an inevitable consequence of his form-centered (thus, ocularcentric and phonocentric) perspective on signs in general. In reality, an adequate analysis of a phenomenon like proper names requires in-depth expertise knowledge on the diverse linguistic levels and cognitive semiotics of a particular language. For example, Frege's conditions of 'sense' and 'referent' cannot make every native speaker access the identical visual image form for each underlined expression

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46) In the combination or connection of the sign components involving the sense(s), Frege does not allow for any involvement of subjective ideas and conceptual interpretations.

(e.g., 'Cap' in 'Little Red Cap' (cf. '망토' mangto "cloak" or '모자' moja "hat" in Korean); 'Ayers' in 'Ayers Rock' for Uluru; 'Hottentot' in 'Hottentot Venus' for Sarah Baartman; '바보' babo in '바보 온달' babo ondal "Fool Ondal"; '므두셀라' meudusela in '김수한무 [...] 므두셀라 [...]' "Kim Suhanmu [...] Methuselah [...]'). Here, the term 'a mode of presentation' is highly vague, but Frege rejects the help of semantics and pragmatics. In addition, he rejects and ignores the metaphorically and/or metonymically induced meanings in defining the sense (even though Frege himself enjoys the benefits of the cognitive effects by using metaphor and metonymy in the examples of 'Venus', 'the morning star', and 'the evening star'). As for him, the sense's effect is more like that of an 'emotional interpretant' (i.e., a preconceptual sensation-centered effect) in Peirce's terminology (Chevalier, 2015). Whether it is possible to capture and integrate both the ground and the emotional interpretant under the name of 'the sense' is a remaining question.

At this point, however, there is one metasemiotic observation that is noteworthy. When it comes to the sign types of Frege's sign components, Frege argues for the strict usage[47] for the pairing of each sign component and each sign type[48]: (1) the verbal representamen as the symbol; (2) the visual object/ interpretant (?) or effect as the icon (cf. ground); (3) the referent (or,

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47) It is a rationalist's idealized model that exists in the superficially glottocentric and fundamentally ocularcentric universalists' minds (e.g., in the realism proponents' premises) rather than in the scientifically empirical and logically systematic dimension that can reflect the (meta-) translative principles of proper names.

48) In Peirce's (1931-1958) theory, there are many sign types (e.g., (1) the linguistic signs as the legisigns (owing to the man-made law-like habits or conventions underlying the examples); (2) the ground-denoting and quality-based signs as the qualisigns (due to the quintessentially quality-centered nature); (3) those signs that are translated as an object/ entity as the rhemes (for the interpretation made in terms of some quality); among many others) ("Semiotic Theory of Charles Sanders Peirce", n.d.). Here, for the sake of efficacy and simplicity, the three major sign types (i.e., the icon; the index; the symbol) are used, instead.

the referent-related semiosic effect) as the index. Here, from a metatranslative perspective, one can guess that Frege presupposes the main sign types for the sign components of a proper name: (1) the symbol, (2) the icon, and (3) the index. Surprisingly, this set of sign types in Frege's Venus-based semiosic terms are similar to Peirce's account on the sign types of proper names (e.g., the legisign, the rheme, and the index) (Weber, 2008). So, it is possible to infer that Frege strives to show the irreducibly tight yet separate mechanisms among and across the three semiosic components, from which the main sign types arise in the logical dimension slash relation via translations, not in the minds' mental lexicon based on the dyadic model of the sign.

Yet, the real question is concerned with the applicability of Frege's idealized sign model to proper names, which does not seem to be fully guaranteed. When viewed from a metatranslative perspective, Frege's sign systems do not consider or apply any language-system-centered (or even cosmological-system-centered) investigation into the nature of proper names. The knowledge about astronomy is highly restricted to the simple information about the time-sensitive and location-sensitive availability of the visual sign(s) of Venus as the referent (to be precise, that of the sun-induced light transmission effects involving Venus)—assessed from Earth—only. So, it seems proper to address the spatiotemporality as a main factor in Frege's exemplification.

If time-sensitive formal (thus, visual) variation is considered as a key factor for the different names and senses of the same object/ referent, there are some counterexamples to consider. For instance, the morning star can refer to other objects (e.g., Mars; Mercury; Sirius; some unique person/ town/ ship/ train with that name) even under the same time condition. Besides, some objects possess different sense-referent dynamics in relation to temporality

(e.g., Jacob's Pillow Stone (= The Stone of Scone?), King Harold vs. King Harold in *Shrek 2*, LG/ Google/ Naver/ Starbucks in logo evolution practices, Mickey Mouse, Sonata of Hyundai, Prince of Wales, King of France, Britain's King, Paul Smith, etc.). In brief, the Peircean metasemiotic analysis results[49] do and can show the intricacy and complexity of proper-name-related translative mechanisms in a systematic way, which Frege's rigid sign model cannot explain at times.

Another variable to note is the location of observation. Frege chooses the regularly yet discontinuously available examples that derive from a certain inferior planet's peculiar orbit. Due to the unique umwelt condition of the planet Earth, there can exist such a distinct pair of astronomical phenomena called Phosphorus and Hesperus (or the morning star and the evening star). For scientific studies or metatranslative research on the proper names, however, the location of observation (e.g., the eastern/ western sky) may not be able to function as a steady and powerful variable. Although it seems that some location-specific examples[50] are observed (e.g., Michael Hastings in Australia vs. Michael Lord/ The Earl of Loudoun/ Britain's Real Monarch in the U.K. (Robinson, 2004)) in a systematic manner, Frege's criteria for the senses (in terms of objectivity, visual specificity with abstract schematicity per spatiotemporal location, and collectively shared knowledge of the visual image form per sense) do not help analyze or explain all the human-related examples

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49) Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to note Frege's focus on the quality-related value of the visual property, the law-like role of the conventional verbal sign form, and the ultimate ontological value of a single definite object/ entity as the unique referent.

50) Even though there may be some supporting examples (e.g., a few names for a unique mountain or river), it is crucial to examine diverse examples (including those of human individuals) metatranslatively because there are culturohistorically hybridized cases of interlingual and/or intralingual translations, which are unrelated to the language-specific senses.

in a logically consistent way. It is because many human properties and attributes are not something that is easily recognizable by resorting to the visual form(s) of the referent only (e.g., 세종대왕(世宗大王) sejongdaewang "King Sejong the Great" for 이도(李祹) yido "Yi Do").

Concerning location-sensitive visual variation, there are (counter-) examples to discuss (e.g., Burger King vs. Hungry Jack's; Sarah Baartman vs. 'Hottentot Venus'; 'Mata Hari' as Margaretha MacLeod vs. 'mata hari' "the eye of the day/ dawn", "sun" in Malay vs. 'Mata Hari' "the lead role in the musical"; 'Mark Twain' as Samuel Clemens vs. 'Mark Twain' as a sign in the Mississippi river; 'V' as 김태형 Kim Tae-Hyung of BTS vs. 'V' as the TV series (but not 'V' when used as the sign of George H. W. Bush in Canberra); Uluru/ Ayers Rock to tourists in the U.K. vs. Uluru/ Ayers Rock to Anangu people; Mabrokan/ Mabrukan[51] and its clones; Athens in Greece vs. Athens in the U.S.A.; 해 hae "sun" vs. 태양 taeyang[52] "sun").

Therefore, it does not seem that Frege's description of the senses of the proper names via the visual-system-based abstraction and the minimum consideration[53] of the language system can guarantee full applicability and systematicity when the scientific facts about the two stars are taken into account in a metasemiotic manner. Such logical inconsistency and inadequacy remain problematic and become obvious when many proper name examples[54]

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51) The name 'Mabrukan' has twelve identical-looking visual representamens and twelve identical-looking referents because Woo-Suk Hwang produced eleven clones of the legendary camel (Thayi, 2023; Schager, 2023). If there is only one name for the unique black camel and his clones, there cannot be more than one sense and one referent according to Frege's terms and definitions.

52) In Korean, there are two different proper names for the sun. In terms of the sense, however, 'hae' and 'taeyang' do not and may not have two distinct senses/ images.

53) Namely, as the phonomorphemic form or shell with no investigation into specific individual ideas or interpretations that concern the proper-name-related phenomena.

are taken into consideration in the real world.

Now, the Peircean notion and typology of translation can be applied to Frege's examples for more insight.

4.3. In Terms of Translation Types

Based on the Peircean perspective on the sign process itself as a kind of intrasemiotic/ intersemiotic translation (Peirce, 1931-1958), scholars propose various translation types (Jakobson, 1959; Petrilli, 2003; Queiroz & Aguiar, 2015; Jia, 2019; Torres-Martinez, 2020). Despite the taxonomic diversity in the detailed features, all translation types stem from the core dynamics among the three sign components.

Since Frege's terms make no contextual or theoretical consideration about (metasemiotic) translation in detail (cf. interlingual translation) (Frege, 1948, 213), it is going to be useful to examine them in metatranslative ways. From such an analysis (mostly described in the previous sections), it is possible to observe, at least, 4 translation types: (1) intersemiotic translation; (2) intrasemiotic translation; (3) interlingual translation; (4) intralingual translation. Firstly, the intersemiotic translation process and product can be found (i) in the intrasemiotic translation process as a sign's meaning-making instance, (ii) in the (initial) naming process across different sign modalities and/or systems, and (iii) in scientific diagrams/ pictures or educational drawings about Venus (or about its orbit/ appearances). Secondly, the interpretation of a name or a

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54) Here, Frege's example of Aristotle is disregarded purposefully. His confusion or misuse of the visual aspect (e.g., the white dot in the morning sky) for a relational or cultural property slash attribute (e.g., the teacher/ student of someone) should be treated as his vague overgeneralization of the abstract terms (e.g., aspect, mode, property, etc.).

visual appearance for the referent is a kind of intrasemiotic translation. Thirdly, the adoption of a less familiar or non-native linguistic expression from some exotic or archaic sources (e.g., 'Venus'; 'Phosphorus'; 'Hesperus') is an interlingual translation practice. Lastly, verbal paraphrasing between 'the morning star' and 'Phosphorus' (or between 'the evening star' and 'Hesperus') can be viewed as intralingual translation instances.

Prior to the intersemiotic translation from the effect/ memory of the (abstracted) visual image form(s) into a certain proper name, the preconceptual and nonlinguistic recognition of the white spot(s) as some unique celestial object(s) must have been motivated by iconicity (thus, the white dot entrenched as a Peircean ground) (cf. sense). In the intersemiotic translation from the effect/ memory of the visual image forms(s) into a certain name, the (un-) conscious use of indexicality (e.g., dawn/ east vs. dusk/ west) or iconicity (e.g., visual iconicity between the white spot and the (sun) light, cross-domain iconicity between the beauty of an ancient goddess and that of the white celestial object) must have motivated the selection of a distinct expression (e.g., 'the morning star', 'Phosphorus', 'Venus', etc.) (cf. metonymy[55] and metaphor[56] at work (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980)).

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55) Metonymy is based on the part-whole and/or cause-effect relations (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Some mention contiguity and/or causality as the driving force(s), which reminds us of Peirce's indexicality (e.g., the white dot-like appearance and the visually abstract image form standing for Venus, the word 'morning' referring to only a few hours before sunrise while meaning the general and entire time period for the morning, etc.).

56) Metaphor is activated by perceived iconicity and realized by means of the cross-domain mapping from some properties in the concrete source domain onto the similar or identical properties in the abstract target domain (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In the process of naming the white round thing in the sky after the ancient goddess 'Venus', the metaphor [BEAUTY IS WHITENESS/ ROUNDNESS] may be a motivating factor. As Frege rejects any subjective or poetic interpretation about the referent, the name of the planet is not a great concern here. However, the sense-related names (e.g., Phosphorus, Lucifer, the morning star, etc.) and its

As for Frege, the two sign types (i.e., the icon, the index) and the two sign properties (i.e., iconicity, indexicality) are considered to be more primary and fundamental in the translative processes, types, and principles (thus, Frege's senses and referent to be interconnected logically, not perceptually or ideationally). Although the symbol and symbolicity in the verbal language domain seem to take up a superior role on the surface (by calling the name examples the signs), they are valuable and effective only to the extent that names can function as verbal representamen examples (thus, only within the selected sign's translative process, not throughout the language system).

Frege minimizes the roles of the mind/ brain and the verbal sign forms by allowing for the formation of the abstract visual forms[57] (as senses) only for the selected things. Yet, it is not verified whether such a sense exists or if that is just dependent on the literal meaning of each expression (e.g., the

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referent(s) draw attention because the referent issue is of significance in terms of metaphor. In the tradition of christianity, there are debates on the correct meanings and referents when it comes to the reading of the name 'the morning star', especially, in the Book of Isaiah (Gill, 2008). If subjective interpretations are to be discarded in a discussion on the sense(s) of a proper name or singular term, alternative subjective interpretations (e.g., those about Sirius, Mercury, Jesus, a British newspaper, an American town, etc.) should not be available as distinct senses. But, in reality, such concrete senses slash interpretations are taken to be true, distinct, and collectively understandable to a great degree ("Morning Star", n.d.).

57) Strictly speaking, even within the same spatiotemporal context (e.g., from summer to early fall in the year 2023), the things that appear in the sky will be different (e.g., in the evening time in July, 2023 or in the morning time in September, 2023). If the sky as the background scene is not considered as part of the observed thing(s) in order to extract the abstract and objective visual image, the validity of the sense as the abstract visual entity becomes more problematic. If some kind of schematically abstracted image needs to be presupposed, then, what Frege depicts as the telescopic-image-like visual forms (as the two distinct senses of the morning star and the evening star) cannot make sense because the telescopic views can capture many different phase-sensitive formal variations in the appearances of Venus (like the phases of the moon) instead of showing one simple image form. Simply put, the universal schematic image account of Frege's sense is not compatible or consistent with the telescopic view account (i.e., one $\neq$ many).

morning star, the evening star). All in all, the Venus-related examples are purposefully selected by Frege as a visually appealing sign package (not necessarily as the most representative sign examples for proper names) via intersemiotic translation. And, it is the Peircean approach to translation that can help delineate each term's (or each sign example's) intrasemiotic slash intersemiotic translation mechanisms as well as each example's intralingual and interlingual translation dynamics.

V. Further Discussion

In a discussion on the nature and classification of a proper name's meaning, the primary concern should be the mechanisms of the sign modalities and systems of the semiosis examples, especially, in terms of the sign process involving the sign components, types, and translations. Here, the translative mechanism therein implies the evolutionary possibility for further or different interpretive interactions.

In the oral modality in a particular language, 'Phosphorus' or 'the morning star' does not have the status of a proper name guaranteed or even implied. The specific phoneme sequence (before the meaning confirmation as a distinct morpheme) only has the potential to be a (or any) word at this stage. In the biblical context, 'Phosphorus' can refer to Jesus Christ, Mary, or Saint John in a metaphorical sense ("Morning Star", n.d.). Or, in an interlingual translation process, it can refer to Lucifer via a literal transfer. In a historical context of modern chemistry, 'phosphorus' can refer to the special chemical element that exists in the bones (called '인' (in) in Korean). Or, in the ancient Western mythology, 'Phosphorus' can refer to an imaginary creature that

people call a deity. As there are more than a single entity to and for which a specific proper name is used in many particular languages, the issues about homonymy remain unsolved.

In the visual modality or multimodality, it is conditionally true that there is a small white entity in the morning sky during a certain period every year. The visual image observed is not the actual and real referent. It is a nonstop series of light reflection and transmission made, firstly, in aid of the sun's light waves/ particles and, secondly, by means of the human vision system in the brain. Frege makes no distinction between the immediate referent and the ultimate referent, and many get confused between the immediate referents and the Fregean senses with no metatranslative (re-) reading. Visually speaking, not all communities take the scientifically defined planet as the ultimate referent. Also, not all unique entities with many names have the time-sensitive (or location-sensitive) sense variation as the immediate referents. So, Frege still has some clarification to do.

In Frege's main examples, what is interesting is the fact that he makes an intentionally selective choice for a certain celestial object that has etymologically and scientifically unique histories. Among countless sign examples available in the universe, Frege does not have any scientifically valid or adequate reason[58] for such a choice (other than cherry-picking).

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58) A celebrity-based example (e.g., Aristotle) is not logically consistent or theoretically compatible in spite of the high citation frequency (e.g., Plato's pupil, Alexander's teacher). According to the definition and criteria set by Frege in his Venus-based account, the objectively obtainable and abstractly visualized image forms that contain and reflect distinct modes of display for the ultimate referent can qualify as (candidates for) senses. Since the statues and paintings of Aristotle are not based on the factual information about his visual images, the sign users' collective sharing of the objective and abstract image forms about Aristotle (as a pupil vs. as a teacher) cannot be guaranteed. In addition, the objectively identical visual images of "Plato's pupil" and "Alexander's teacher" cannot naturally appear

Elsewhere, when other scholars use proper names in their Fregean applications (e.g., Aristotle, Prince of Wales, The King of France, Clark Kent, etc.), they rely on certain celebrities of famous stories or settings. However, the semiotics of proper names cannot be boiled down to or remain identical to the semiotics of historically famous individuals and their conceptual features in the application of Frege's ocularcentric semiosic terms. Therefore, researchers need to be more aware of their own (meta-) semiotic and (meta-) semantic literacy skills and dimensions prior to the non-critical or loose application of Frege's exemplification.

Nevertheless, his idealized sign model implies the theoretical and practical value of the sign-internal translative process realized through a triadic mechanism.

VI. Conclusion

In a Peircean metatranslative analysis of Frege's Venus-centered examples, the results suggest (1) Frege's triadic reading of the sign process and types, (2) Frege's implicit yet decisive use of translation per se and the main translation types, and (3) Frege's intentional selection of Venus made in a reductive and ocularcentric way to optimize the cherry-picking[59] effect (while

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in people's minds and show some distinct visual aspects of Aristotle's physical form (as the senses in relation to the referent). Such scenes need multimodality-based and frame-specific conceptual networks (cf. the optical image forms: not available and not sufficient). The tendency of identifying the two images/ senses of Venus with the two scenes/ titles of Aristotle is ascribed to metaphor-based overgenralization (cf. a quality/ property: a visual aspect & a personal feature).

59) Such a choice may be useful for his selective truth-value argumentation, but not optimal for the in-depth scientific investigation into the nature, process, mechanism, and dynamics of the

underestimating the significance of the linguistic theories on proper names).

Among the numerous semiotic (as translative) processes of the Venus-related sign examples, Frege selects the spatiotemporality-sensitive proper names in German (or in English in the English translation) as the major sign examples (yet, as the verbal representamens in the oral modality or, to be precise, as the phonemic representamens at the phonological level of a particular language called German) and connects each representamen as the major sign form with what he sees as the objectively (thus, collectively) and abstractly visual image form (called the sense), which is argued to be non-subjective (on non-individual), non-associative, non-experiential, non-conceptual (or non-ideational), non-perceptual, and non-psychological (or non-mental) in its nature. He, then, has each sense locate, determine, and specify the ultimate referent in relation to the pertinent verbal representamen. In such a sign process, the semiosis is fundamentally interpretive and (intra-/ inter-) semiotic (thus, neither thematically interpretational nor mentally semantic). Although he heavily depends on the oral modality/ system and the visual modality/ system in his delineation of the distinct semiosic relation between the different oral/ verbal representamens for the same referent (even at the expense of the reductivist distillation of the proper names' linguistic meanings), he is aware of the quintessential roles of the triadically translative mechanism and dynamics within a basic sign process (that is, translation per se in focus). Regarding Frege's translation per se, the sense is argued to play a key role as the intermediary agent between the verbal representamen and the ultimate referent and as the semiosic determinant for the designation of some object as the ultimate referent. As the Fregean sense is "the common property"

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proper names' meaning-making phenomena available in reality.

(Frege, 1948, 212) with a specific display mode, of which the visual content/ effect can be understood and transmitted across diverse barriers (in spite of the allegedly independent nature that it possesses against the human individuals' sensory, perceptual, conceptual, and/or associative experiences), it is possible to infer that Frege's sense is closer to Peirce's meaning as a translative effect than to Saussure's signified as a mental concept (in addition, more similar to Peirce's ground as the pure abstract quality in some respect than to Peirce's immediate object or immediate interpretant). Frege's sense, however, faces logical problems and factual errors due to the scientific validity issues on its number (cf. the moon-like phases of Venus), existence (e.g., WHITENESS), directionality (cf. the referent's causality as an impact factor), and applicability (cf. each objective and abstract white dot in the dawn/ dusk = the telescope-aided visual images observed every dawn/ dusk even in the presence of another morning/ evening star like Mars/ Jupiter ≠ other cultures' metonymy-based or metaphor-centered associative meanings like the feathered serpent?). The validity-related questions increase upon the introduction of other linguistic and cultural counterexamples to Frege's criteria for the sense of a proper name, especially, in the applicaion of Frege's Venus-based variables like the observation time and location.

In terms of the sign types, Frege presupposes the symbolicity of the verbal representamens for Venus, the iconicity of the sense (cf. the ground), and the indexicality of the referent-related semiosic instance/ effect of each proper name, which indicates the sign-internal intersemiotic translation processes among the symbol, the icon, and the index (cf. Peirce's legisign, rheme, and index) for proper names.

Concerning the translation types, Frege is aware of natural nonhuman intersemiotic translation (vs. natural/ cultural human-body-internal intersemiotic

translation for a linguistic semiosis), anthropocentric endosemiosic translation for language, human-body-sensitive intersemiotic translation, interlingual translation between particular languages, and intrasemiotic translation (as a sign process as translation per se) while considering the Venus-related translation types rather loosely (e.g., intralingual translation between 'Venus'/ 'Phosphorus' and 'the morning star', interlingual translation from the Latin word 'Venus' into the German/ English word 'Venus', etc.).

Theorists and students need to be careful in their overgeneralized applications of the notion of the Fregean sense to all sorts of proper names since the visual-modality-based yet abstraction-centered sign forms as the senses are strictly restricted to the cases of the celestial body's orbit-sensitive appearances, of which the three main variables are (1) the observation-sensitive spatiotemporal locations (e.g., east before sunrise, west after sunset), (2) the anthropocentrically interpreted visual saliency (e.g., whiteness/ brightness of what is observed), and (3) the human beings' universal capacity for (visual) abstraction. (Elsewhere, it is found useful to consider metaphor and metonymy as part of the Peircean metatranslative mechanisms in the analysis of diverse Venus-related interpretations[60].)

In conclusion, Frege's Venus-based theorization can benefit from a Peircean translative (re-) analysis and further metasemiotic revision. The Peircean metatranslative paradigm and approach are expected to help shed more light not only on Frege's Venus-based exemplification but also on the

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60) If subjective interpretations are to be discarded in a discussion on the sense(s) of a proper name or singular term (e.g., 'Venus', 'Phosphorus'), alternative subjective interpretations (e.g., those about Sirius, Mercury, Jesus, a British newspaper, an American town, etc.) should not be available as distinct senses. But, in reality, such concrete senses slash interpretations are taken to be true, distinct, and collectively understandable to a noticeable degree ("Morning Star", n.d.).

nature and dynamics of the proper-name-related linguistico-cultural phenomena as a unique dimension of a language's single-referent-related meaning-making practices. More importantly, this research suggests that the Peircean paradigm of translation per se can and will help many researchers out with their meta-level interpretations/ translations.

【주제어】프레게, 고유명, 뜻, 지시체, 퍼스의 번역

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[국문초록]

본 연구는 퍼스의 기호내재적 번역 개념을 중심으로 한 접근법을 금성에 대한 프레게의 예시 및 용어에 적용시킴으로써 고유명 해석 및 동일성/ 차이성 관계 분석에 필수적인 요소로서 프레게가 제안한 기호, 뜻, 지시체에 대한 이해를 도모하는 것을 그 목표로 한다. 따라서 근원적 번역에 대한 퍼스의 광범위하고 복합적이며 통찰력 있는 기호 기반 관점(즉, 의미 생성 과정 및 기호 작용으로서의 번역에 대한 관점)을 사용하여 프레게의 금성 관련 명칭 예시들을 기호의 삼원적 요소와 유형 및 번역의 주요 유형이라는 측면에서 메타기호적, 메타번역적 방법으로 분석하고자 한다. 분석 결과는 다음과 같다: (1) 프레게의 기호는 발화 기호 형식(즉, 언어적 표상체)이다; (2) 프레게는 명칭 해석/번역에 사용된 기호 유형이 상징, 도상, 지표에 속함을 인지하고 있다; (3) 금성과 관련한 발화 표상체 예들은 개별언어 내 번역 또는 개별언어 간 번역의 결과물이다; (4) 추상적인 시각적 영상 형태로서의 프레게의 뜻은 가설적 방식으로 추상화된 성질로서 퍼스의 용어에서 (도상적 성격의 선개념적 상태인) '기반'(ground)과 유사하다고 볼 수 있으며 이는 뜻을 즉각적 대상체 또는 제시 방식 그 자체로 보는 주장들과 다르다; (5) 금성 관련 주장을 기준으로 할 때, 실세계에서 프레게의 뜻이 가지는 적용력은 과일반화의 방식으로 사용되어 나타나지만 이론적으로는 과대평가된 면이 있고 실증적인 근거가 미약하다; (6) 프레게의 지시체는 상대적으로 퍼스의 역동적 대상체(즉, 궁극적 지시체)에 근접한다; (7) 음성형식 중심의 정적인 형성과 시각 중심의 무작위적 일반화에도 불구하고, 프레게의 삼원적 분석은 퍼스의 삼원론적 관계와 유사한 부분이 있다; (8) 기호내재적 번역 과정은 프레게의 기호 모형에서도 명확하게 나타난다; (9) 금성이라는 예시에 기반한 프레게의 고유명 관련 메타언어는 여러 반례에 직면하고 있다; (10) 프레게의 예시화 및 이론화 과정에서 은유와 환유를 유용하게 사용한 반면에, 자신의 메타언어상에서는 주관적 해석과 관련하여 은유와 환유를 부정하는 입장을 취한다. 결론적으로, 프레게의 예시 및 용어들은 퍼스의 메타번역적 접근법을 통하여 보다 명확하고 체계적인 방식으로 설명될 수 있다.

[Abstract]

Is Frege's Venus Translated?
- A Peircean (Meta-) Translative Approach

Lim, Dhonghui (Pusan National University)

This research aims to make a Peircean approach to translation per se and apply it to Frege's metasemiotic examples about Venus for a better understanding of Frege's star-based theorization about the sign, the sense, and the referent, which are claimed to be essential in interpreting proper names (e.g., 'the morning star'; 'the evening star'; 'Phosphorus'; 'Hesperus') and analyzing the relation of identity (or difference) therein. With Peirce's broad, complex, and insightful perspective on translation as a sign process (namely, meaning-making slash semiosis) (Peirce, 1931-1958), Frege's famous star examples and relevant terms are analyzed metasemiotically and metatranslatively in terms of the mechanisms of the sign's three components and/or three types (Petrilli, 2003) and, also, with regard to the dynamics of translation types (Jakobson, 1959). Such an analysis shows that (1) Frege's sign is a verbal sign form (i.e., a linguistic representamen); (2) Frege is aware of the three major sign types (e.g., the symbol; the icon; the index) used in the interpretive/ translative processes of a proper name; (3) Some verbal representamens are the results of intralingual or interlingual translation; (4) Frege's sense as the abstract visual form is similar to a hypothetically abstracted quality called 'a ground' (a preconceptual state of iconicity) unlike the claims about the immediate object or any presentation mode; (5) The power of the Fregean sense in reality is theoretically overrated and empirically unproven in spite of its overgeneralized uses; (6) Frege's referent is relatively close to Peirce's dynamical object (as the ultimate referent); (7) Frege's trichotomy is akin to Peirce's triadic relation in spite of the phonocentrically static formation and the ocularcentrically random generalization; (8) Sign-internal translative processes are evident in Frege's sign model; (9) Frege's Venus-based metalanguage on proper names faces counterexamples; (10) Frege's metalanguage denies metaphor and metonymy while he utilizes them in the exemplification to his advantage. In conclusion, Frege's examples

and terms can be better explained with a Peircean metatranslative approach.

【저자연락처】 dhlim@pusan.ac.kr